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Large scale integration of today’s aerospace systems is achievable through the use of 
distributed systems. Validating the safety of distributed systems is significantly more 
difficult as compared to centralized systems because of the complexity of the interactions 
between simultaneously active components. Integrated hazard analysis (IHA), a process used 
to identify unacceptable risks and to provide a means of controlling them, can be applied to 
either centralized or distributed systems. IHA, though, must be tailored to fit the particular 
system being analyzed. Distributed systems, for instance, must be analyzed for hazards in 
terms of the functions that rely on them. This paper will describe systems-oriented IHA 
techniques (as opposed to traditional failure-event or reliability techniques) that should be 
employed for distributed systems in aerospace environments. Special considerations will be 
addressed when dealing with specific distributed systems such as active thermal control, 
electrical power, command and data handling, and software systems (including the 
interaction with fault management systems). Because of the significance of second-order 
effects in large scale distributed systems, the paper will also describe how to analyze 
secondary functions to secondary functions through the use of channelization. 
Nomenclature 
CEV         =    Crew Exploration Vehicle  
FHA         =    Functional Hazard Analysis 
FMEA      =    Failure Modes and Effects Analysis  
FTA         =    Fault Tree Analysis  
GNC        =    Guidance, Navigation and Control  
IHA          =    Integrated Hazard Analysis  
ISS           =    International Space Station  
MNWF =  must not work function  
MWF =  must work function  
NASA      =    National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Primary Hazard Effect  = worst case effect of hazard which manifests itself 
Primary System    = system under assessment whose hazards directly result in undesired events  
SAVIO          =    Software and Avionics Integration Office  
Secondary Hazard Effect = additional effects of hazard which manifests itself 
Secondary System   = a supporting system whose failures can induce undesired affects in the system it  
       supports 
I. Introduction 
 Many in the safety community have noticed the preponderance of techniques focused on reliability and 
fault/failure analysis in the literature. These techniques can generally be called fault-event techniques and are 
powerful tools to aid safety personnel in reducing unwanted risks due to faults. All risk-reduction techniques,  
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Error Type Meaning in Hazard Analysis 
Type I (false positive) Reporting risks higher than they actually are 
Type II (false negative) Omitting hazards or reporting risks lower than 
they really are 
Type III (solving wrong problem) Focusing analysis on faults or reliability versus 
on system safety 
 
Table 1. Decision Errors in Hazard Analyses 
however, are not created equal. Each risk-reduction technique must be chosen commensurate with the goal of the 
analysis, the structure and interactions of the organizations involved in the system and the constraints of the system 
being analyzed. The inappropriate use of risk-reduction techniques for large scale systems contributes significantly 
to miscommunication, schedule overruns, cost overruns and a false sense of confidence in understanding and 
controlling unwanted system behavior. Distributed systems, for example, form the infrastructure that enables other 
system must-work (MWF) and must-not-work functions (MNWF) to operate and be managed. Because of this, 
distributed systems must be analyzed using top-down, system-oriented techniques. The authors advocate the primary 
use of system-oriented techniques like integrated hazard analysis (IHA) for distributed systems in conjunction with 
secondary bottom-up failure-oriented subsystem techniques in this order. We believe this combination is appropriate 
to minimize errors of decision in reducing system-level risks for large scale distributed systems. The types of 
decision errors that will be reduced with the approach described in this paper include type II errors (false negatives, 
that is, overlooking hazards when hazards indeed exist) and type III errors (the error of having solved the wrong 
problem) (see table 1). 
One of the primary underlying questions program and project managers want answered for large scale distributed 
systems is “Is the system safe?” Complete and absolute safety is a condition that is free from risk or harm. Some 
might even say that absolute safety appears to reside where there is perfect knowledge and complete control. This 
implies that all variables, parameters, factors, influences and interactions are known, delineated and controlled. This 
condition is far from true in present day real world large scale integrated systems. Since absolute safety is not 
attainable, particularly for inherently complex or hazardous systems, realistic system safety objectives are to develop 
a system with acceptable risk. This involves establishing a systematic approach that identifies potential hazards, 
analyzes their risks and then implements corrective actions to either eliminate or mitigate the hazards throughout the 
system lifecycle. From this perspective, system safety can be viewed as a relative or optimized level of acceptable 
risk for a given system and its resource constraints. The goal of system safety is to detect hazards as exhaustively as 
resources permit and to provide protective measures early in the system development to avoid costly design changes 
late in the program. Each step of this process involves a sequence of decisions that collectively guide the analyst 
toward the set of identified hazards, toward the set of hazard causes, toward the set of possible mitigations which 
generally leads to the identification of analyzed risk. A subsequent set of decisions generally identifies whether the 
analyzed risks are acceptable or not.  
In order for analyzed risks to be accepted by a program manager or an independent safety panel, there must be 
some level of confidence in the safety process which produced the results. Without this confidence in the overall 
safety process, many will view the effort as “cosmetic only” with no real teeth to integrate safety into the actual 
design. In order to have an effective system safety program, a systematic process should be designed to minimize 
both systematic and uncertainty errors in judgment because each wrong decision in the sequences of decisions biases 
(to some degree) the risk results. Table 1 describes the three types of decision errors that should be minimized in a 
hazard analysis. Type I errors, false positives, are obtained when the hazard analysis reports there is a hazard, a 
cause or an increased level of risk when the real level of risk is significantly lower. Type I errors can be viewed as 
errors of excessive credulity. Type II errors, false negatives, are obtained when the hazard analysis omits a hazard, a 
cause or reports a decreased level of risk when, in reality, a hazard does exist, a hazard cause is valid or the real 
level of risk is significantly larger. Type II errors can be viewed as errors of oversight and result from information 
being overlooked, under analyzed or not communicated. For hazard analysis, the goal is to provide balance and 
context to the types of errors encountered. In some cases, type I errors may be more serious. In other cases, type II 
errors may be considered more serious. 
In 1957, Allyn W. Kimball, a statistician with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, proposed a different kind of 
error to exist with the first and second type of errors. Kimball defined this “error of the third kind1” as being “the 
error committed by giving the right answer to the wrong problem.” In 1974, Mitroff and Featheringham extended 
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Kimball’s definition, arguing that “one of the most important determinants of a problem’s solution is how that 
problem has been represented or formulated in the first place.” They defined type III errors as “the error of having 
solved the wrong problem...when one should have solved the right problem
2.” For hazard analysis, this error occurs 
when the hazard analyst employs the use of failure-oriented or reliability-oriented techniques to solve system safety 
problems. Since hazards encompass more than faults and failures, the application of failure-oriented or reliability-
oriented techniques to system safety problems produces a grave and serious type III error that provides a false sense 
of confidence in the results. For this reason, type III errors from a hazard analysis perspective may be considered 
more serious than type I and type II errors. This statement is not absolute, it is a heuristic. It is conditioned on the 
resources (financial, personnel and schedule) allotted to the task and the ultimate goal of the risk analysis. 
An appropriate response to the question, “Is the system safe?” involves minimizing the decision errors that 
hazard analysts perform in their duties. This can be decomposed into two complementary processes. First, the 
response to what is “safe enough” must be addressed in the context of the endeavor. Second, the response to what is 
“not safe enough” must be identified with a process to address these findings. The approach outlined in this paper 
will attempt to minimize these errors in a hazard analysis by focusing on a subset of the decisions that must be 
made.  
II. Background 
To provide greater clarity to this discussion, background will be provided on the subset of decisions that must be 
made to answer the safety question. The major decisions involve selecting appropriate safety personnel with systems 
perspectives, understanding the differences in failure-oriented versus system-oriented tools and the limitations of 
each, recognizing the need to tailor the hazard analysis based on the structure of the organization and the type of 
system being developed (centralized versus distributed) and iterating the hazard analysis throughout the system life 
cycle to reduce uncertainty in the risk results.  
A. System Safety Personnel Requirements 
 
Of all the major decisions that have a profound effect on the end product, no problem is more important than the 
“who” problem. Questions like “Who will lead the system safety process?” and “Who will be the contributing 
members of the hazard analysis team, the safety assurance team, the safety panel, etc.?” are all who-type questions 
that require who-type decisions. In order for a program manager or safety panel to have confidence in the output of a 
hazard analysis, there must be some level of confidence in the person/team leading the analysis. Geoff Smart and 
Randy Street identify the impact of decision errors in personnel selection in their book titled, “Who3.” 
What are some of the general requirements for system safety personnel? Allen Long, Senior System Safety 
Engineer with Hernandez Engineering states that an analyst must have “...sufficient understanding of the details of a 
wide variety of systems and subsystems
4.” He continues by saying “the analyst must understand the system as an 
integrated interaction of subsystems.” Simply stated, it is in the complex relationships and interaction of systems and 
components that reveal hidden discoveries. System safety personnel should have this perspective and mindset. 
Morris and Massie reveal requirements for IHA integrators
5
 by analyzing necessary and sufficient requirements 
related to cognitive ability, expertise, emotional competence and big picture thinking. Their analysis reveals the 
need for interactive collaborators. These leaders as described by Michael Maccoby, in his book “The Leaders We 
Need
6” focus on teamwork and self-development. Their strengths include their independence, their readiness for 
change and their quick ability to connect with others and work in a self-managed team. They are natural 
communicators and collaborators. They tend to be aware of their own transferences and generally rely on others 
(usually an outsider) to provide reality checks. In short, the Interactive Collaborator combines multiple capacities 
(emotional, strategic, big-picture thinking, etc.) into a cohesive whole in order to provide leadership to 
organizations. Organizations that employ personnel with these characteristics for large scale system safety 
applications prevent many of the type I, II and III decision errors in the end product because the personnel have the 
proper systems perspective throughout their analyses. Brad Cohen, from Boeing Information, Space and Defense 
Systems, provided lessons learned that described how to improve complex integration tasks related to the 
International Space Station (ISS), arguably the most complex large scale integration program developed during the 
1990s. The number one lesson learned from ISS development was, “Hardware and software must naturally integrate 
by working the integration task from day one. This is solved by education, working together, and removing 
barriers
7.” In other words, the number one lesson learned from ISS development dealt with people, their perspectives 
and their mindsets. 
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Figure 1. Resistance to Change Pyramid
8
 
It is humorous to note that some organizations inadvertently sabotage the safety of their large scale systems by 
employing personnel who do not have or utilize a systems perspective. Reasons for this include an established 
organizational culture, a legacy of solving problems in pre-defined manners and a general resistance to change as 
depicted in the resistance to change pyramid
8
 (figure 1). In general, safety analysts tend to experience more 
difficulty when there is a mismatch between their system safety perspective and a failure oriented perspective 
adopted by either a program manager or a safety panel. This clash of perspectives can be viewed as pushing a 
boulder up the resistance to change pyramid. Much energy is expended and wasted when consistent system safety 
perspectives are not employed (type III errors). 
B. Knowledge of Failure-Oriented versus Systems-Oriented Safety Techniques and Their Limitations 
 
Every practitioner utilizes, to some extent, a set of tools associated with a particular discipline. In the world of 
risk-based or risk-informed decision analysis, this is particularly true. In order to reduce type III errors (solving the 
wrong problem), organizations not only have to select appropriate personnel but also need to ensure system safety 
personnel know how to apply risk-based tools. This necessarily includes the limitations of such tools and techniques. 
Some techniques are appropriate for identifying hazards while others are appropriate in analyzing or identifying 
failures. System safety analysis, in particular, requires the use of techniques that consider the system as a whole and 
identifies how the system operates, identifies the interfaces and interactions between subsystems, identifies the 
interactions between the system and operators, and identifies both normally correct behavior as well as component 
failures. Techniques such as system hazard analysis, integrated hazard analysis and hazard causal analysis are 
examples of appropriate tools for identifying hazards for system safety. These techniques involve the use of 
functional decomposition and allocation to individual subsystem components. In some cases, the functions are 
refined further into must work and must not work function partitions. This decomposition and refinement helps to 
distinguish between actions that contribute to correct and incorrect system behavior as well as critical and 
noncritical behavior. 
Some organizations improperly apply failure/fault or reliability-oriented techniques like fault tree analysis (FTA) 
and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to do the job of a system level hazard analysis not fully 
understanding the intent and limitations of such tools. This misapplication takes several forms. Fault tree analysis, 
for instance, though performed from a top-down perspective, is generally a means of analyzing hazards, not 
identifying them. FTA, however, with a skilled practitioner can reveal problems with a system or “eurekas” as 
explained by Allen Long
4
. Long advocates the use of FTA in a much broader sense than is generally used. Many of 
his arguments are coupled with the use of personnel that have logical minds and the ability to visualize the structure 
and interactions between systems and subsystems. In order to utilize FTA for system safety, he also stresses the 
analyst to not define the tree branches in terms of failures. In summary, without a skilled practitioner, FTA alone is 
not appropriate for system safety. 
FMEA techniques are generally used to predict equipment or component reliability. This technique is not 
appropriate for system safety because it was not designed particularly for identifying hazards. Hazards, from a 
system perspective, are more than faults. Hazards can stem from problems related to human error, design flaws, 
malfunctions or undesirable interactions which may occur when there is no faulty behavior. FMEA techniques are 
based on the assumptions that inputs into the component are correct, the operational environment is proper (and does 
not contribute to component failures), and human error (in terms of assembly, maintenance and other operations) is 
not a factor. Though FMEA techniques provide an excellent detailed examination of each internal component, 
organizations that utilize FMEA techniques for system safety inadvertently increase type III errors in their risk 
analysis. 
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Figure 2. Constellation’s ISS Design Reference Mission9 
C. The Need to Tailor the IHA for the System being Analyzed 
 
In addition to selecting appropriate personnel with system perspectives and knowledge of when and where to 
utilize analysis tools, organizations also need to understand that the hazard analysis needs to be tailored for the 
system being developed. This tailoring needs to incorporate the structure of the organization, the roles between 
engineering and safety organizations, the functional responsibilities and interactions between sub-organizations, the 
timing of the hazard analysis products for major milestone reviews, the type of system being designed, etc..  While 
the need to tailor a hazard analysis is a broad subject, this paper focuses on how to tailor a hazard analysis for a large 
scale distributed system. 
D. Centralized versus Distributed Systems 
 
One of the major decisions a systems analyst must perform is to determine how to appropriately tailor a hazard 
analysis for the type of system being developed. We will confine our descriptions to either centralized or distributed 
classifications. A centralized system is one that allows certain functions to be concentrated in the system’s hubs. 
Benefits of centralization include the accessibility of resources and the power to make decisions for the whole 
system. Centralized systems also have limitations with data management and security; not to mention adaptability to 
new issues and environments. Single point of control and single point of failure are major issues with centralized 
systems. On the other hand, a distributed system consists of a collection of subsystems or components connected 
through a network which enables the subsystems to coordinate their activities and to share some resources so that 
users perceive the end product as a single, integrated system. Advantages of distributed systems include the ability 
of subsystems to execute concurrently, the option of increased adaptability to new technologies and the combination 
of heterogeneous components. Disadvantages include multiple points of control, multiple points of failure, a lack of 
system integrity if concurrent processes are not coordinated properly, and the increased need for organizational 
structure and agreement. Despite the disadvantages, many of today’s large scale integrated systems are distributed 
by design. 
In short, the collection of system requirements embodies the needs, goals and objectives of the end users. In 
effect, system requirements exist to describe the needs and the purpose of the system. System requirements are 
further decomposed into functions that help achieve either system performance objectives or system-level 
constraints.  Functions, from the system perspective, delineate the operations the system must perform to satisfy the 
requirements and to achieve the system objectives. In many systems, only a subset of system functions contributes 
directly or indirectly to system level hazards. For distributed systems, it is generally the subsystems that perform the 
system functions. Distributed systems, in particular, form the infrastructure that enables system must-work (MWF) 
and must-not-work functions (MNWF) to operate and be managed. This is done by determining which set of 
subsystems are required to perform the system level function. For instance, a generic distributed communication 
system permits each subsystem to coordinate sub-function behavior to achieve each integrated system level function. 
From a hazard analysis perspective, most system or functional hazards have primary and secondary effects.  An 
example of a large scale distributed aerospace system is NASA’s Constellation program whose mission is to take 
humans back to the moon and onto Mars. The first phase of the mission is to launch an Orion crew exploration 
vehicle (CEV), dock the Orion vehicle with the ISS and then return to earth
9
 (see figure 2). For the majority of large  
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Figure 3. Constellation’s Integrated Hazard Analysis Structure 
scale systems like this one, the hazards related to the primary effects are of most concern. Some examples include 
“loss of CO2 removal results in toxic atmosphere to crew” and “failure of docking attachment mechanisms to fully 
engage results in inadequate structural integrity.” For many of the distributed systems, it is the secondary effects that 
are generally of most concern. For example, loss of power is a vehicle architecture configuration issue, but the loss 
of attitude control that is created by the loss of power is a primary hazard of  the guidance, navigation and control 
(GNC) subsystem and therefore is a secondary hazard of the power subsystem. In summary, distributed systems 
must be analyzed for hazards in terms of the functions that rely on them. It should be noted that distributed system 
primary hazards must also be included in the hazard analysis, but these are often limited to the box or component 
level hazards. Examples include electric shock, fluid leakage, etc. 
E. The Iterative Integrated Hazard Analysis Process 
 
To be effective, the system safety process should employ an iterative hazard analysis process so that all available 
data are analyzed for potential hazards throughout the design cycle. Only in this way can safety be designed into the 
product and insights into potential hazardous behavior be revealed early enough to prevent the hazardous behavior 
or to mitigate the hazardous behavior by way of effective redesign. The hazard analysis process specifically iterates 
between the hazard causes and the hazard control story in such a way as to realize a system with acceptable risk. 
This is a defining difference between failure based analysis and true hazard analysis. The importance of the iterative 
nature of the hazard analysis throughout the system lifecycle has been stressed by DoD in MIL-STD-882D
10
.  
Massie, IHA lead for NASA’s Constellation program, has prescribed four keys to success that if adopted will lead a 
system safety analyst to accomplish the enormous task of integrating various systems iteratively in a large scale 
distributed system
11
. These keys reveal strategic, operational and organizational lessons learned from previous IHA 
experiences including the International Space Station. The four keys are: 1) define the analysis structure, 2) provide 
a good IHA plan, 3) provide for good and reliable communications and 4) select and utilize the right personnel for 
the job. The first key tailors the hazard analysis for the type of system being analyzed and establishes the appropriate 
tools used to produce the risk declarations. Good adherence to this key significantly reduces type III errors (solving 
the wrong problem). The second key effectively tailors the analysis to the organizational structure and the processes 
defined for the system. The third key describes the lifeblood of how information is transmitted, communicated and 
received across various organizations to produce the risk assessment. The final key elaborates on the importance of 
selecting the right personnel for the task (previously described in section II. A). These steps were applied to NASA’s 
Constellation program where multiple subsystems (Orion crew exploration vehicle, Ares I crew launch vehicle, 
mission operations, EVA astronaut suits and ground operations) were integrated across a mission timeline to dock 
the Orion crew exploration vehicle with the Space Station and safely return the crew to earth (see figure 2). The 
structure of Constellation’s IHA involved analyzing the undesirable interactions between the subsystems that could 
lead to a hazard (see figure 3). The IHA process involved identifying all hazards in this system-of-subsystems  
 
 
Orion IHA 
Ground Ops IHA 
Ares IHA 
Mission Op IHA 
FMEA/CIL
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Timeline Phase
Functional Event
Functional 
Failure (Hazard 
Topic)
Failure to latch Failure to retract TBD failures
Failure to pressurize 
vestibule
Inadvertant mode from 
free drift
Inadvertant ISS 
translation
KU pointing error
Inadvertant mode from 
free drift
Inadvertant CEV 
translation
Inadvertant LIDS jettision
Hazard
Hazard Report 
Developer
Ares
Primary 
Stakeholder(s)
CEV/ISS CEV/ISS TBD CEV/ISS ISS ISS ISS CEV CEV CEV
Comments\ 
Homework
ISS fails to maintain proper docking configuration resulting in failure to dock, 
backout/breakout, structural damage to either ISS and/or CEV, or about
CEV fails to maintain proper docking configuration resulting in failure to dock, 
backout/breakout, structural damageto either ISS and/or CEV, or about
Docing procedure fails to achieve proper dock resulting in backout/breakout, structural damage, 
or abort
Docking
CEV maintains configuration for dockingDocking procedure ISS maintains configuration for docking
Do
cki
ng
SE&I ISS CEV
FMEA/CIL
FTA
IVHA
FHA Dock
ing
Constellation 
IHA 
FMEA/CIL
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
FMEA/CIL
Fault Tree 
Analysis
Integrated 
Vehicle 
Hazard 
Analysis
EVA IHA 
FMEA/CIL
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
FMEA/CIL
Fault Tree 
Analysis
Integrated 
Vehicle 
Hazard 
Analysis
FMEA/CIL
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
FMEA/CIL
Fault Tree 
Analysis
Integrated 
Vehicle 
Hazard 
Analysis
FMEA/CIL
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
FMEA/CIL
Fault Tree 
Analysis
Integrated 
Vehicle 
Hazard 
Analysis
FMEA/CIL
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
FMEA/CIL
Fault Tree 
Analysis
Integrated 
Vehicle 
Hazard 
Analysis
 
Int Stack 
Integrate with ISS 
FMEA/CIL
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
Likelihood Justification:  <10>
Acceptance Rationale:  <9>
Hazardous Condition Description:  <8>
Mission Phase:  <7>
Affected Element:  <6>
Risk Matrix  <11>
(Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence 
with controls in place)
Item Part No:  
<5>
Subsystem 
Name:  <5>
System/ Element Name: 
<5>
Status:    <4>
___Open
___Closed
Title:  <3>
Review Level:  <2a>Date:  <2>
Revision:
Hazard Report Number:
FMEA/CIL
Fault Tree 
Analysis
Integrated 
Vehicle 
Hazard 
Analysis
ALTAIR IHA 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
7 
 
 
Figure 4. Systematic Hazard Analysis Process 
 
 
Figure 5. The Hazard Analysis Phased Review Process 
 
context, identifying all causes to each hazard, revealing the control story (while subsequently determining the risk 
associated with the control story) and providing verification of the controls in a systematic and iterative fashion (see 
figure 4). According to Constellation guidelines, hazard-related risks are to be identified during phased safety 
reviews which occur around major program milestones. Hazards, for instance, are identified during the program’s 
initial design cycle, causal contributors are identified during the system definition review, controls are identified and 
analyzed during the preliminary design review with the verifications outlined during the critical design review (see 
figure 5). At each major review, the goal of the iterative hazard analysis is to ensure that the system stays in a known  
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Hazard Cause Hazard Type Primary Effect(s) Secondary Effect(s) 
Plate 
Tectonics
12
 
Volcanoes 
Lava flow, pyroclastic 
flow, tephra (volcanic 
bombs & ash falls), 
volcanic gases 
Lahars (debris flows/mud 
flows) and tsunami 
Plate 
Tectonics
12
 
Earthquakes 
Release of seismic energy 
(shaking), shifting of the 
land surface 
Building collapse, fires, 
tsunami, landslides and soil 
liquefaction 
 
Table 2. Primary and Secondary Effects for Specific Natural Hazards (Volcanoes and Earthquakes) 
safe state regardless of the mission timeline or the state transitions. Wherever possible, the hazard analysis also 
attempts to update system requirements or system-level functions to ensure that the system remains in a known safe 
state according to the program’s level of acceptable risk. 
III. Analysis Techniques for Distributed Systems 
A hazard is defined as a condition which if unmitigated could result in a mishap. It may also be viewed as a state 
or set of conditions, internal or external to a system, which has the potential to cause harm. Because distributed 
systems must be analyzed for hazards in terms of the functions that rely on them, care must be taken to ensure that 
both the primary and secondary hazards effects are analyzed with respect to both the primary and secondary 
systems. This section describes generic IHA processes to employ for system safety in order to analyze system 
hazards associated with both primary and secondary systems. The procedures outlined are intended to be generically 
prescriptive in intent targeted for use on large scale distributed aerospace systems. Special considerations, however, 
will be described for specific distributed systems such as active thermal control, electrical power, command and data 
handling and software subsystems. Because of the significance of second-order effects in large scale distributed 
systems, a process will also be described to analyze the interaction between secondary functions. 
The following definitions are provided to establish common understanding between potentially confusing (and 
similar sounding) terms. The primary system is the system under assessment whose hazards directly result in 
undesired events. In like manner, the secondary system is a supporting system whose anomalous behavior can 
induce undesired effects in the system it supports. Technically, primary hazards refer to direct, potentially 
threatening results to targets (in aerospace contexts, targets refer to the crew, the vehicle, ground personnel, etc.). 
The primary hazard effect is generally the worst case effect of the hazard on the target. Secondary hazards, in 
contrast, may be viewed as indirect threats to targets. These hazards are sometimes called generic hazards since they 
stem from distributed system infrastructures and usually affect multiple primary hazards. Secondary hazard effects 
are additional worst case undesired effects separate and distinct from the primary hazard effects. Separate and 
distinct in this context does not necessarily imply the lack of causality or dependence.   
To aid the discussion of hazard effects, a brief description of primary and secondary hazards associated with 
volcanoes and earthquakes is provided in table 2. Since these types of natural hazards are widely known, let’s 
discuss two interesting points that may not be readily understood. First, volcanoes and earthquakes are both 
considered natural geological processes (systems) in and of themselves. But, when they affect human beings (as 
targets) in the environment, they are classified as hazards. Second, both volcanoes and earthquakes share the same 
underlying cause, that is, plate tectonics
12
. It is the interaction of the plates (subsystems) that allow major geological 
processes to take place such as volcanoes, earthquakes and the formation of mountain belts. Thus, the same 
underlying cause (plate tectonics) can produce different behavioral results depending on the details of the interaction 
between the plates (the subsystems) and the environment (chemicals, temperature, timing, etc.). Though distinct 
from hazards typically present in the aerospace industry, table 2 should provide a general understanding of the cause 
effect relationships by describing phenomena associated with primary and secondary hazard effects. In like manner, 
we will endeavor to explain and to simplify, as much as possible, how to identify and to analyze potential hazard 
effects associated with large scale distributed aerospace systems.  
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Figure 6. Overview of System Engineering Process
13
 
A.  Validate the redundancy and independence of the primary system hazards controls 
 
An overview of a generic system engineering process
13
 is shown in figure 6. In order to assess the hazards 
associated with primary and secondary systems, the system level functions must first be identified along with their 
allocation to lower level subsystems. Functional analysis is the process that assigns, maps and traces high level 
functional requirements to subsystems or components of the physical design. It is in the iterative requirements and 
design feedback loops that IHA benefits the system. In common large scale distributed aerospace systems, the top 
level system functions can generally be clustered into power, avionics, environmental controls & life support, 
structural/mechanical, propulsion, GNC, communications, command & data handling and software system 
categories (to name a few). Depending on the purpose of the design, the requirements and the constraints, some of 
these systems can be considered primary systems while others can be considered secondary systems. To add to the 
complexity, these are not generally considered static relationships because primary and secondary systems are 
classified relative to the role they play in achieving the function. In other words, primary and secondary system 
classifications depend on the function the system is designed to perform.  This, in turn, depends on how the sub-
functions are allocated in the distributed system. Early in most standard hazard analyses, a proper system level 
functional analysis and a functional hazard analysis (FHA) resolves many of these issues by determining the system 
level function and their allocation to the lower level sub-functions. This functional allocation helps identify primary 
systems associated with system level functions which, in turn, help provide definition to the distributed system 
architecture. 
Much of the iterative IHA process involves assessing and reassessing the control story in order to resolve 
prescient hazards (see figure 4). Let’s call this particular system the primary system being assessed. The goal is to 
validate the redundancy and independence of the primary system hazard controls and to ensure that these controls 
are maintained as they are processed through the distributed system. This is accomplished by assembling a complete 
list of MWFs and MNWFs that depend on the distributed system. Next, itemize the hazard controls for each 
MWF/MNWF that relies on the distributed system for the primary function being assessed. Finally, analyze the 
distributed system architecture in terms of its ability to maintain the redundancy and independence of the hazard 
controls for each primary function that relies on the distributed system architecture. This is accomplished by creating  
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Figure 7. Distributed Allocation of Functions for GNC-related hazards (notional) 
tables, matrices and diagrams that track each primary function control through the distributed system and then 
validating that the redundancy and independence of the hazard controls are maintained. This process is repeated for 
each primary system being assessed in the hazard analysis process. 
A brief example of this process is seen in the causal directed graph in figure 7. This generalized graph analyzes 
the hazards associated with the GNC system while docking two different vehicles in space. The top oval (or first 
layer) represents what is being analyzed, that is, hazards of the GNC system before and during docking. The FHA 
will generally reveal all events where GNC functionality is required. The second layer is used to partition the set of 
system level functions into MWF and MNWF categories. The third layer describes four functions that must be 
accomplished by the integrated system in order to avoid GNC hazards. The last layer generalizes the implementation 
of the distributed architecture where each space system can be considered a subsystem of the integrated system. 
Each space system has its own collection of subsystems (GNC, power, software, propulsion, etc.) instantiated and 
constrained by the space system architecture on the vehicle. It is the goal of each space system to perform the sub-
functions (not shown) allocated to it. Time/event synchronization and time-to-effect conditions must also be 
coordinated between the two space vehicles. From a systems perspective, it is the interaction between the 
subsystems on both space vehicles that constitute the distributed system. 
B.  Assess distributed system for undesired events which will affect all or most primary system hazard 
controls 
 
The distributed system must now be assessed for undesired events which will affect all or most primary system 
hazard controls it handles. This is accomplished by looking for the conditions which will set up the integrated 
system to lose the ability to function. The features of the distributed system that mitigate the set of conditions should 
be documented in a hazard report or a whitepaper. This document should be referenced from the primary system 
hazard reports. Finally, validate that the distributed system features provide mitigations within time to effect of each 
primary hazard being addressed. 
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C.  Special Considerations for Specific Distributed Systems  
 
Though the procedures identified thus far are applicable to many large scale distributed aerospace systems, the 
process needs to be tailored even more to handle certain types of distributed systems. Here are some special hazard 
assessment considerations for specific distributed systems. 
 
1. Active Thermal Control (pressurized fluid system) 
 
In order to analyze hazards associated with active thermal control systems, recovery procedures for fluid loop 
leakages’ ability to be accomplished prior to time to effect need to be assessed for hazards by boxes that have lost 
cooling support. The partitioning of primary functions needs to be assessed between the active fluid loops for 
independence of hazard controls. Finally, the impact of single loop operations (if utilized) on the required 
redundancy and independence of the primary system hazard controls need to be assessed due to single loop 
operations. 
 
2. Electrical Power 
 
Electrical power is a classic secondary system in many applications since most avionic, control, communication 
and software systems require electrical power in order to perform their own functions. To analyze electrical power 
hazards, first assess the partitioning of primary functions between power channels for independence of primary 
system hazard controls. Second, assess power system capacity to provide minimum power required to support 
minimum vehicle primary functions to get the crew to safety in an emergency. This is achieved by assessing multi-
battery configurations for the ability to tolerate multiple battery failures and still maintain minimum channel 
capacity needed for hazard controls. Next, validate to ensure the power overload response architecture is cascaded 
so that it removes user loads before the whole power system fails. Then, validate that the power system architecture 
ensures that the instabilities cannot cross power channel domains. Finally, validate that load shed functions do not 
simultaneously remove multiple legs of hazard control from primary systems. 
 
3. Command and Data Handling 
 
Command and data handling is a system used for situational awareness and control of critical functions. These 
hazards are in many large scale distributed systems. First, assess the partitioning of primary functions between 
command and data handling channels for independence of primary system hazard controls. Next, there should be a 
validation that command and data handling box fault detection isolation and recovery does not defeat primary 
system hazard control architecture. Finally, validate that the command and data handling fault detection isolation 
and recovery sub-process provides response within time to effect for all primary hazard controls handled by te 
command and data handling system. 
 
4. Software Safety 
 
Software systems are another classic secondary system on which many other systems depend (GNC, propulsion, 
control, aborts, communications, etc.). For boxes which handle all hazard controls or multiple legs of must work or 
must not work functions, a verification needs to be performed to ensure that software safety standards are met (e.g.,  
command and data handling boxes initialize to known safe state, separate control paths, etc.). This should be 
included as part of the command and data handling assessment previously described. Next, there needs to be 
assurance that the caution and warning information for each primary function is provided in time to allow for crew 
responses. This is done by validating out of limit detection algorithms and timing  
delays to ensure that command and data processing tasks do not exceed time to effect of hazards (crew response 
times must be included in calculations). 
 
5. Secondary Functions to Secondary Functions 
 
Analysis of secondary functions to secondary functions addresses the impact of second order interactions in large 
scale distributed systems. In addition to supporting the primary vehicle functions, distributed systems support each 
other. A classic example of this type of analysis is the bidirectional dependence between the electrical power system 
and the software system (see fictional architecture for space vehicle #1 in figure 7). The software system requires 
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electrical power in order to function and operate. The electrical power system, in turn, utilizes the software system to 
identify and manage power system faults. This cyclic dependence needs to be analyzed and controlled to prevent 
system level hazards. Channelization is the process used to assess the risks associated with each primary function 
across all supporting systems. This is accomplished by validating the redundancy and independence of primary 
hazard controls and ensuring that they are maintained. Finally, the analyst needs to validate that redundancy 
management responds properly to the loss of the primary hazard control independent of the control loss source (e.g., 
whether control lost was due to primary or  secondary system failures). This information needs to be documented in 
the primary system hazard report.  
IV. Conclusion 
Validating the safety of large scale distributed systems is difficult because of the complexity of the interactions 
between simultaneous active components. Several processes have been provided to identify and to assess the risk of 
both primary and secondary systems in an integrated hazard analysis using systems-oriented system safety 
techniques. Special considerations were also provided. The net result of these system level IHA techniques is to 
reduce decision errors in a hazard analysis. Significant error reductions can be achieved by selecting personnel with 
system safety perspectives, by being cognizant of the difference between failure-oriented versus system-oriented 
risk reduction techniques, by understanding the fundamental difference between centralized and distributed systems 
and by iterating the prescribed hazard analysis processes throughout the system lifecycle. 
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